Description
RECOMMENDATION: Discretionary grant of $50,000 to Asia Society ( https://asiasociety.org/ ) in renewed support for the Task Force on U.S.-China Relations
In the National Defense Strategy released last month, the first NDS in a decade, Defense Secretary Jim Mattis declared, “the great power competition, not terrorism, is now the primary focus of U.S. national security.” The target of the American “hard power” repositioning, as Mattis clearly stated, is China (and to a lesser extent, Russia). Around the same time, a new term, “sharp power,” coined by Christopher Walker and Jessica Ludwig of the National Endowment for Democracy, is gaining currency. It refers to hostile efforts by authoritarian states (read China and Russia) to project influence abroad, and argues for a more forceful response from Western democracies.
How the U.S. should respond to a more powerful and confident China, a China that has already risen and is playing a significant role in global affairs, carries enormous implications. Many observers argue that, beyond responding to crises and otherwise pressing issues in the relationship, there needs to be a thorough reappraisal of the U.S. strategy toward China. One year into the Trump presidency, the “hard power” and “sharp power” discussions, and the looming trade war between the two countries, seem to point to escalation and confrontation, but they are less a coherent policy direction than expressions of frustration and alarm felt by many on the right and the left, in and out of government.
In September 2015, we made a discretionary grant to Asia Society for a bipartisan Task Force on U.S.-China Relations, co-chaired by Orville Schell, the Arthur Ross Director of the Center on U.S.-China Relations at Asia Society, and Susan Shirk, a UC San Diego professor and a former Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for East Asia. The Task Force issued a well-received report in February 2017, and briefed new White House appointees, Republican senators on the Senate Foreign Relations Committee, and officials in the Departments of State and Defense. Schell says, “what was surprising to us in the prevailing climate of uncertainty was how eager many new Trump Administration officials were to get a new set of practical policy tools and ideas for how to proceed with China. Most showed real receptivity to the report and its conclusions, and we feel that we now have established several key relationships that we will continue to engage with and build upon in our ongoing work.”
Asia Society sees a real need to continue the work of the Task Force over the next two years and requests our renewed support. The group is currently comprised of about 20 bipartisan China experts, including economists, academics, think tank analysts, and former government officials, diplomats, and military experts. The proposal appendix contains an impressive list of the members; their deep and complementary knowledge of U.S.-China relations brings real strength to the Task Force.
Besides providing an ongoing assessment of and recommendations on a variety of challenges in the bilateral relationship, the Task Force has created two “working groups” on pressing concerns that require deeper examination. One will focus on the “sharp power” question, and the other will explore new approaches to reviewing and regulating Chinese high-tech investments. While there is a dearth of China expertise within the Trump Administration, the Task Force has assembled the relevant high-caliber experts to address these topics.
The total budget for the next two years is $200,000. Carnegie Corporation will be the main funder, while Asia Society and UC San Diego will provide personnel and general support.
